One of the less common reasons for ‘contesting’ a will is the forfeiture rule. Under this rule, a beneficiary is disqualified from inheriting if they have unlawfully killed the deceased, or even if they have unlawfully aided, abetted, counselled or procured the death.
This is a matter of public policy – clearly, if you could still inherit after killing someone, there would be a rather large motive for doing so!
Court’s discretion to grant relief
However, the Forfeiture Act 1982 gives the court discretion to modify or waive the effect of the rule in appropriate cases. The court may allow an offender to inherit if it is satisfied – having regard to the conduct of the offender and of the deceased and any other relevant circumstances – that the “justice of the case” requires such a modification.
This relief is a purely statutory discretion and is not available for anyone convicted of murder (the Act explicitly prohibits relief in murder cases). In other words, the law recognises there are hard cases (mercy killings, survivors of suicide pacts, a battered spouse driven to kill, etc.) where strictly enforcing forfeiture would be too harsh, so judges can soften the outcome – but never in the case of murder.
When deciding whether to grant relief, the court will look at all the material circumstances. Some key factors include:
- Relationship between offender and deceased: e.g. a long-married spouse versus a more distant relative.
- Moral culpability of the offender: Was the killing intentional or premeditated, or was it an act of mercy or self-defense?
- Nature and gravity of the offense: The court weighs how serious the crime was (e.g. brutal violence versus a momentary lapse).
- Intentions of the deceased: Did the deceased still want the offender to inherit (perhaps not anticipating the tragedy)?
- Size of the estate: The value of the property at stake can factor into the fairness of either forfeiture or relief.
- Offender’s financial position: The court may consider the offender’s needs and resources.
- Claims of other potential beneficiaries: Who else would inherit if the offender is disqualified, and do they have a strong moral claim?
These factors, distilled from cases like Dunbar v Plant [1998] Ch 412, guide the judge’s holistic assessment of whether justice requires relaxing the rule in a particular cases.
Classic cases illustrating the rule
A classic example of the rule in action is Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] 1 QB 147. In that case, a husband had taken out a life insurance policy on his own life (worth £2,000 – a princely sum in 1892) for the benefit of his wife. When he later died from poison administered by his less-than-loving spouse, the court unsurprisingly applied the forfeiture rule and held that the wife could not claim the insurance money.
Another famous case is Re Crippen’s Estate [1911] P 108. Dr. Crippen was convicted of murdering his wife Cora. The Probate Court refused to let Dr. Crippen’s accomplice (his mistress) administer the wife’s estate; instead, it allowed one of the deceased’s next of kin to take out the grant. In short, the murderer (or anyone claiming through the murderer) was prevented from controlling or benefitting from the victim’s estate. These early cases established the principle that a killer cannot profit – not as beneficiary, executor, or otherwise – from their crime.
Beyond murder: manslaughter and other unlawful killings
Although the rule originally arose from obvious murder cases, it is not limited to murder. Over time, it has been applied to manslaughter and other unlawful killings short of murder.
For example, the rule covers a person who participates in a suicide pact or assists another’s suicide (which is a criminal offense under the Suicide Act 1961). In Dunbar v Plant [1998] Ch 412, the Court of Appeal held that the forfeiture rule does apply to a survivor who helped their partner commit suicide.
Significantly, the court noted that the rule “now applies to all cases of unlawful killing” (except perhaps those involving insanity) – so it extends to any unlawful killing, not just intentional murder. In practice, however, courts often grant relief in these tragic scenarios. In Dunbar, although the survivor had technically broken the law by aiding a suicide, the court exercised its power to grant her full relief from forfeiture given the compassionate circumstances (it was the product of desperation and a suicide pact, not a malicious motive).
The forfeiture rule’s reach is illustrated by modern cases of unintentional homicide as well. In Amos v Mancini [2020] EWHC 1063 (Ch), an elderly wife was convicted of causing her husband’s death by careless driving (a road accident). You might wonder if a tragic accident of that nature would trigger the rule – and the court confirmed that it does: causing death by careless (or dangerous) driving, being a criminal offense, counts as “unlawful killing” for purposes of the forfeiture rule. That meant the widow stood to lose her inheritance, including the family home that normally would pass to her by survivorship.
However, after determining the rule technically applied, the judge then considered the circumstances under the 1982 Act and granted relief, effectively waiving the forfeiture in full. The widow’s momentary lapse of attention behind the wheel was deemed insufficient moral blame to justify disinheriting her entirely – especially since denying her the house and estate would have been grossly disproportionate to her fault. (It’s worth noting, as an aside, that when the rule does apply to jointly owned property, it severs the joint tenancy – preventing the killer from automatically inheriting by survivorship.)
Assisted dying and mercy killing scenarios
Another area that has tested the boundaries of the forfeiture rule is assisted dying. Technically, assisting someone’s suicide is unlawful killing in the eyes of the law (it falls under aiding and abetting suicide, contrary to the Suicide Act 1961). But these cases often evoke great sympathy. The leading early example is again Dunbar v Plant, where the courts acknowledged that a survivor of a suicide pact or an assisted death may be acting out of love rather than malice. In fact, Parliament anticipated such mercy-killing situations when enacting the 1982 Act ensuring the possibility of relief.
A very recent case, Morris v Morris [2024] EWHC 2554 (Ch), illustrates how the courts handle modern assisted dying situations. In Morris, a 73-year-old woman (Myra Morris), suffering from an incurable degenerative condition, traveled to a clinic in Switzerland with her husband and adult children to end her life. Her husband helped make the arrangements for the trip. Under the letter of the law, that meant he had encouraged or assisted in her suicide – an unlawful act – so the forfeiture rule was technically engaged against him.
The High Court agreed that the rule applied but then proceeded to exclude its effect entirely by granting him full relief from forfeiture. In other words, given the compassionate circumstances, he was not made to forfeit any inheritance. The court also took care to distinguish degrees of involvement: merely accompanying a loved one to an assisted dying clinic, without actively assisting, does not necessarily amount to “unlawfully aiding” their death. In Morris, the couple’s children who traveled with their mother were found not to have assisted in the suicide at all – they did not lose any inheritance rights, since they had no intent to encourage her death and their presence alone was not considered criminal. This clarification provides some reassurance that families acting supportively under such difficult circumstances won’t be unfairly punished by the rule.
Courts have also shown leniency in cases of so-called “mercy killings.” For example, in Macmillan Cancer Support v Hayes (Re Hayes) [2017] EWHC 3110 (Ch), an 84-year-old husband killed his terminally ill wife (and attempted to take his own life) to spare them both further suffering. The court granted full relief, allowing his wife’s estate to pass to his beneficiaries, essentially recognising the act was motivated by compassion and despair rather than malice. These cases underscore that while the forfeiture rule applies to unlawful killings in all forms, the judicial safety valve of relief is often employed to reach a just result in tragic, empathetic circumstances.
Civil findings of unlawful killing
Note that a criminal conviction is not actually required for the forfeiture rule to operate. Even if the killer is never convicted – for instance, if they were acquitted at trial or never prosecuted – a civil court can still decide that the person unlawfully killed the deceased, on the lower civil standard of proof (balance of probabilities).
A recent illustration is Leeson v McPherson [2024] EWHC 2277 (Ch). In that case, a husband (Mr. McPherson) was tried for the murder of his wife Paula but was acquitted by a jury due to lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Paula’s son and father then brought a civil claim under the forfeiture rule. After a lengthy trial, the High Court found that, on the balance of probabilities, the husband had deliberately drowned Paula during their holiday in Denmark. Consequently, the court ruled that he forfeited any benefit in her estate. This included not only losing his entitlement under her will/intestacy but also losing the benefit of jointly owned property.
The couple’s home was owned as joint tenants; normally, he would have inherited it by survivorship when she died. Instead, the court held that the unlawful killing severed the joint tenancy, so Paula’s share of the house passed to her estate (to be inherited by her rightful heirs) rather than to the husband. This case confirms that the forfeiture rule can be enforced via civil proceedings even when the criminal justice system provides no punishment, ensuring that a wrongdoer cannot financially benefit from a wrongful death on a mere technicality of proof.
Who inherits the forfeited share? – The 2011 reforms
When a killer is disqualified from inheriting, the question arises: who gets the share instead? Historically, the law had some gaps in this area that led to potentially unfair results (innocent substitute beneficiaries could be bypassed). This was addressed by the Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Act 2011, which came into force on 1 February 2012. Under this reform, a person who forfeits their inheritance (or who disclaims it) is treated as having died immediately before the deceased. In effect, the law pretends the killer pre-deceased the victim.
For intestacy cases (no will), the estate will pass to the next entitled relatives as if the offender were not alive at the time of the death. (The 2011 Act achieved this by inserting a new section 46A into the Administration of Estates Act 1925, which directs that the offender is deemed to have died first.)
So, for example, if a man is killed by his son, and there is no will, the son cannot inherit; instead, the estate would go to whoever would have been next in line – perhaps the victim’s other children or siblings – just as it would if the murderous son had died before his father.
For wills, the Act similarly inserted section 33A into the Wills Act 1837. This provides that when a beneficiary forfeits or disclaims a gift, they are treated as having predeceased the testator, unless the will indicates a contrary intention. The will can then operate as though that beneficiary was never meant to receive the gift. Often wills have substitutionary provisions (like “to my son, but if he predeceases me then to his children”), so under the new law the gift can pass to the next person in line (for instance, the killer’s children, i.e. the victim’s grandchildren).
The key aim of the 2011 Act was to prevent “innocent” secondary beneficiaries (such as the killer’s children or other relatives of the victim) from being deprived of an inheritance just because of the offender’s wrongdoing. Now, the law ensures that in the scenario of forfeiture, the estate is distributed as if the offender wasn’t there, rather than simply being absorbed by the state or diverted in a way the deceased wouldn’t have wanted.
(Notably, the 2011 Act does not affect the court’s discretion to grant relief – it only kicks in once it is determined that a person’s share is truly forfeited and not reinstated by any court order.)
Choosing between forfeiture relief and an Inheritance Act Claim
What can a person do if they are disqualified by the forfeiture rule but believe they ought to receive something from the estate? In many cases, their only hope is to seek relief under the Forfeiture Act 1982 (as described above). However, there is sometimes an alternative: making a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 for reasonable financial provision. In fact, Section 3 of the 1982 Act explicitly confirms that being disqualified by forfeiture does not prevent someone from bringing a 1975 Act claim.
This was illustrated in Land v Land [2006] EWHC 2069 (Ch), where a son who had killed his mother was barred by forfeiture from receiving the estate she had left him. The court held that the son could still pursue a claim under the 1975 Act as a disinherited child, since the forfeiture rule’s effect was that no “reasonable provision” had been made for him (even though the will originally had provided for him).
In short, the two avenues – relief under the Forfeiture Act or a claim under the 1975 Act – are alternative strategies. A claimant in that situation must choose carefully, because each route has different time limits and potential outcomes.
Time limits:
A major practical difference is timing. For a relief application under the Forfeiture Act 1982, the window is very tight. If the would-be inheritor has been convicted of an unlawful killing offense (e.g. manslaughter), they must commence their application within three months of the date of conviction. This deadline is rigid – the court has no power to extend it.
In Land v Land, for example, an application filed just four working days late was deemed out of time and could not be heard. (If there is no criminal conviction – say the person was never charged or was found not guilty – then the statute imposes no fixed time limit for applying for relief. In such cases the claimant should still act promptly, but they aren’t bound by the three-month rule.)
It has also been clarified that if an initial conviction is later quashed or changed, the clock runs from the latest conviction. For instance, in Challen v Challen [2020] EWHC 1330 (Ch), the applicant’s murder conviction was quashed on appeal and replaced with a manslaughter conviction. The court held that the three-month period ran from the date of the manslaughter conviction (the “subsequent conviction”), not from the original murder verdict – thus her application for relief was considered in time.
By contrast, for an Inheritance Act 1975 claim, the time limit is a somewhat more generous six months from the date of the grant of representation (i.e. six months from when probate or letters of administration are issued for the estate). It’s worth noting also that the 1975 Act gives the court discretion to allow a late claim in appropriate circumstances. Courts have occasionally exercised this discretion to permit out-of-time claims (for example, in cases like Berger v Berger [2013] or Bhusate v Patel [2019] where there were compelling reasons for delay), but the recent trend is for judges to be cautious about extensions.
In Cowan v Foreman [2019] Fam 133, a notable case, the court refused to validate an agreement to extend time and warned that delays beyond a few months would be hard to excuse.
Potential outcomes:
The other key difference is what the claimant stands to gain. If relief under the Forfeiture Act is granted, the person is essentially allowed to take whatever the deceased intended them to have (possibly the entire estate). By contrast, an award under the 1975 Act is limited to such provision as the court considers “reasonable” for the claimant’s maintenance or needs – often much less than the full inheritance.
As noted by the court in Land v Land, a 1975 Act claim would only yield a reasonable financial provision, whereas a successful modification of the forfeiture rule could result in the claimant receiving the whole estate. Therefore, if a person has the option to seek relief (and especially if they were the main beneficiary under the will or intestacy), that route can be far more beneficial financially.
Consider though, that the forfeiture Act route is only available in non-murder cases and within that strict time frame. If that ship has sailed – or if the killing was murder (making relief legally impossible) – a 1975 Act claim might be the only recourse to secure any benefit at all. In such a scenario, the claimant must be an eligible applicant under the 1975 Act (e.g. a spouse or financial dependent of the deceased) and persuade the court that the circumstances warrant some provision despite the egregious background.
Jennifer Wiss-Carline is a practising Solicitor regulated by the SRA and a Chartered Legal Executive (FCILEx), bringing over two decades of experience to her practice. Specialising primarily in Private Client law, Jennifer expertly handles matters including Wills, Inheritance Tax and Estate planning, Lasting Powers of Attorney for individuals and businesses, Deputyship Orders and more.
